Solutions
Authority belongs to a person and a role — never to a service account.
The enterprise now runs 144 non-human identities for every human one. Agent identity answers which process acted. Directive identity answers whose authority it acted under. Only the second is defensible.
The problem
The Orcher approach
Non-human identities outnumber human ones by roughly 80 to 1 in the enterprise. Most of them hold static, shared, over-permissioned credentials that were issued for a project and never scoped down. Agentic execution turns that inventory problem into an authority problem: a process with a service account can act, and nothing in the record says whose authority it acted under.
Registries do not fix this. Knowing an agent exists says nothing about whether its next action is inside somebody's real authority.
The Role Identity Fabric resolves the directive to an authenticated person, resolves that person's role at that moment, and mints credentials scoped to the directive alone — task-bound, time-bound, expiring on completion. Median role scope in deployment is about 14% of the underlying account's permissions.
Revocation is immediate. A role change, suspension, or termination invalidates authority at the next gate with no agent redeployment, and the ledger keeps the role that authorized each already-committed action so history stays accurate.
Policy documents describe what an agent will not do. Role-scoped authority describes what it cannot do, because the credential it holds does not carry the permission. That distinction is the whole argument: the first is a statement of intent, the second is an enforced boundary.
It is also the difference between an incident that is embarrassing and one that is unbounded. A compromised agent operating on a 14% scope, task-bound and expiring, has a materially smaller blast radius than one holding a standing service account.
Rollout
One workflow, proven end to end, before anything scales.
01
Inventory standing credentials
Identify the shared and service accounts agentic work currently borrows, and what each can actually reach.
02
Model roles, not users
Express real authority — approval limits, populations, jurisdictions — as roles your identity provider and HR system can assert.
03
Mint per-directive credentials
Cut one workflow over to task-bound, time-bound credentials and measure the scope reduction.
04
Retire the standing account
Remove the shared credential once the workflow runs entirely under minted authority.
What you get
~14% median scope
Per-directive credentials carry a fraction of the underlying account's permissions.
Instant revocation
Role changes invalidate authority at the next gate with no redeployment.
Attributable actions
Every committed action names the human and role whose authority it exercised.
Questions
Most often bought for
Derived from the Orcher components this solution engages.
Use case
Clinical authority cannot be delegated to a process.
Use case
Every adjudication is a decision someone must own.
Use case
Public decisions must be explainable to the public.
Use case
Named directives and liability boundaries for this industry.
Use case
Named directives and liability boundaries for this industry.
Proof
144:1
non-human to human identities, up from 92:1
Vol. I, p.11
47%
of CISOs have already seen unauthorized agent behavior
Vol. I, p.8
9 hrs
saved per week by role-directed super-users
Vol. I, p.22
Components engaged
Briefings walk one of your real workflows through the seven components end to end.
Case studies
Modelled reference scenarios with the measurement window, the components enforced and the numbers attached. Each one downloads as a PDF.
Government & Public Sector
Non-human identities outnumbered staff 144 to 1. Role-scoped authority made every one of them answer to a caseworker who could be named.
Manufacturing
The integration fabric verified every proposed write against the plant's own state before it committed — and refused 4.9% of them.
